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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
MAMIE URE BAKER, 
P lain.ti f f, 
vs. 
RICHARD MILLS BAKER, 
Defenda;nt. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
The Statement of Facts found in appellant's brief 
being merely an argumentative recital of a part of the 
matters here involved, requires furiher statement from 
us. We shall not include here discussion of evidentiary 
matters which must necessarily be gone into in sub-
sequent argument and should be referred to ,there to 
avoid repetition. To understand exactly what took 
place here, elaboration of the·issues made and the action 
of the Court is requisite : 
Appellant signed January 22nd, 1949 an affidavit 
in which she recited the provisions of the original decree 
as to support money, and averred (Tr. 040-1) that 
$300.00 thereon then was due and not paid to her. Order 
to show cause on this issued February 3rd, 1949 (Tr. 
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038) and Respondent on February 28th, 1949 made his 
return (Tr. 034 to 037)-it appears out of order in the 
transcript), to which appellant filed a responsive plead-
ing, denominated a "reply" on April 4th. Issues were 
made by the return of respondent and the ''reply'' of 
appellant, the respondent admitting everything con-
tained in the initial affidavit, except that $300.00 was 
due from him, and making a confession and avoidance 
plea as to that. We will refer, so far as the pleadings 
go, only to matters nec.essary for understanding of facts 
in dispute, since the court's findings and judgment cover 
the unquestioned matters. 
Respondent pleaded in exoneration of the claim for 
past due support moneys that appellant had taken the 
children, about November 24th, 1948, to Oregon, with 
intent to make it her permanent abode, that he had on 
prior occasions sought and been refused the privilege 
of taking his children to see his mother, on her birth-
day, and during her last illness, and had been refused; 
and pleaded that appellant thereby was in contempt of 
the court, and that he believed she was without right to 
demand payment of the past due support money. He 
charged her acts to have been done for the purpose of 
preventing him from seeing· the children. 
To these allegations, appellant admitted the re-
moval to Oregon, said she had done so because she had 
sol~ her Utah property and acquired a home at Nyssa, 
contended she never refused him permission to visit the 
children at any time, but that he had wanted to take 
them away from the house which she would not permit; 
alleged a controversy_ over how long the children might 
be kept away in the late November occasion when he 
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requested that they might v-isit his mother with him, his 
statement at that time that he would pay no more sup-
port money, that she took the children out the ne·xt 
morning ''to avoid trouble''; that when he came that 
morning he had cursed and threatened her mother. 
Mrs. Baker said that defendant was subject to fits 
of rage and anger, made ''unusual and unjust'' demands 
in his treatment of the children; that his visits upset 
them and made them ill. She then denied that her 
motive in taking them t~ Oregon was to deprive him 
of the right of visitation, and said: 
''That under the conditions that now exist, it is 
absolutely nec-essary that plaintiff retain her 
residence in the State of Oregon; that her closest 
friends live there and that her children by a for-
mer marriage have established their homes there ; 
that she is in a better position at her present 
residence to support herself than she would be in 
Ogden or Weber County, and that the children 
of the parties are better off at their present 
residence, and it is for their best interests that 
they remain where they are.'' 
Issue also was made in a minor key as to what ef-· 
feet the destruction by fire of Salt Lake property re-
spondent had retained under the decree bad upon his 
ability to pay: 
On the contested matters between the parties, the 
Court found generally for respondent, in substance find-
. 
mg: 
That the appellant had not afforded Mr. Baker 
a reasonable and proper opportunity to visit with his 
childr~n at any time since- the divorce, either she or 
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some adult member of her family always being present 
on such visits, and making them awkward and uncom-
fortable; that she had made preparations to leave some 
lime prior to the incidents of late November, having sold 
her local property and bought the Nyssa home before 
those incidents arose and that by her actions including 
the change of residence, she had wilfully deprived re-
spondent of opportunity to see his children; 
Further· that she intended to stay permanently at 
Nyssa with the children, had visited Ogden three times 
since leaving without bringing any of them along; that 
the children had not suffered by reason of the non-pay-
ment of the support moneys but that appellant had been 
forced to provide for them from her own means; that 
respondent's employment was such that it would cost 
him at least $100.00 in time lost from work and ex-
penses to visit the children at Nyss~. 
Findings go into the matters respecting disputes 
over taking the children to see the dying grandmother 
at length; the court finding a conversation to have been 
had as to appellant's right to receive support moneys 
while denying respondent his requests as to visitation. 
The court found respondent's financial condition to be 
materially worse than at the time of the decree. 
The decree of the Court provided (a) that appellant 
was in contempt of the Court for her action in wilfully 
depriving respondent of his right of visitation given in 
the original decree, and as a penalty, deprived her "of 
the right to enforce payment by defendant of the sums 
accruing upon support moneys, under the terms of such 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
decree, from November 25th, 1948 to the end of Febru-
ary, 19-!9, amounting to $350.00"; (h) modified the de-
cree by redur.ing the total monthly payments of support 
money to $60.00, directing respondent to pay all past 
due at that rate from .lliarch 1st, and (c) made specific 
directions as to the character and nature of visitation 
rights to be given respondent, both at Ogden and Nyssa, 
prescribing length of time, numbers permitted, and par-
ticularly requiring that on such occasions neither plain-
tiff nor any of her relatives should be present. 
Some inaccuracies occur in appellant's statement of 
facts as to figures, and misstatements of the evidence, 
not worth going into here. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS: 
The argument in this case will follow the points be-
low given, which seem to respondent more adapted to 
develop the issues in this case than the outline used in 
appellant's brief. Due reference to appellant's points 
will be made. 
Point No.1. The Court properly rejected the proposed 
findings, conclusions and decree submitted 
by appellant. 
Point No. 2. The Court had power to punish such con-
duct as contempt, and deprivation of appel-
lant of the right to enforce her judgment 
for past due installments was a proper 
penalty, within the discretionary power of 
the Court. 
Point No. 3. Reduction of future installments of support 
moneys was within the dis-cretionary power 
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of the Court under the changed circum-
stances occasioned by removal of the child-
ren from Utah. 
Point No. 4 Monetary loss to Appellant resulting from 
the court's orders is not objectionable as a 
withholding of moneys of the children. 
Point No. 5. The Court was not required to deny re-
spondent relief because of default in pay-
ments due from him. 
Point No.6. The Court rightly denied appellant's re-
quest for modification of the decree to per-
mit continued residence in Oregon, and 
was not requir,ed to afford her an oppor-
tunity to purge herself of contempt. 
Point No.7. The Court properly rejected testimony on 
matters previously litigated and deter-
mined. 
Argument upon such matters follows. 
Point 1. THE COURT PROPERLY REJECTED THE 
PROPOSED FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS 
AND DECRE:E SUBMITTED BY APPEL-
LANT. 
Since appellant has not seen fit to assign in detail 
the matters which she claims were erroneously found 
by the Court, and those in which the Court should have 
found as she proposed, and did not make a finding, we 
are left to her argument to determine in what particulars 
her objections apply. Analysis of the differences be-
tween the two sets of findings and of the supporting 
evidence seems not necessary in other particulars. The 
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arguments "~hich appellant makes emphasize that prin-
cipally she objects to the failure of the Court to agree 
'Yith her claim that her motive in taking· the children to 
Nyssa from Ogden 'Yas as she claimed in her pleading re-
sponsive to the return made by ~Ir. Baker, in which she 
said: 
'• She did not take said children with the desire 
of preventing- the· defendant from visiting them, 
but because she had disposed of all her property 
in Utah and acquired a residence in Nyssa, so 
that it was necessary for her to change her resi-
dence'', 
And the claims which she makes, at various parts of 
the brief, running to the same point, of which we in-
stance: 
''There is no claim that the welfare of the child-
ren is not promoted through the chang·e of resi-
dence to Oregon", (Br. 3). 
"When it appears that the move was for the best 
interests of the children''. ( Br. 4.) 
''The removal of the children-was a reasonable 
exercise of the right of control by the appellant. 
She acted as the best good of the children re-
quired." (Br. 12) 
And because the Court made no order requiring 
appellant to return to Utah with the children, it is as-
sumed that the Court must have determined that the 
welfare of the children so required. (Br. 9, 13, 14, 23, 
26.) 
The issues on this disputed matter having been 
found for the respondent by the Court, we will examine 
the record of appellant's ad:rnlssions by pleading, and 
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in testimony, as well as any undisputed pleading and 
evidence from respondent to see how far the record sup-
ported the Court's determination. It is admitted, as 
we have noted in our Statement of Facts, that Mrs. 
Baker left with the children, about November 25th, 1948, 
shortly after an occasion when respondent had requested 
permission to take the children to see his dying mother 
on the following day: She was gone when he came there, 
she says he was not seen there again with the children. 
Prior to that time she had already sold her Utah prop-
erty and bought the property in Nyssa. At Nyssa she 
had two daughters by a former marriage and other rela-
tives and friends. The record of visitations between re-
spondent and his children after the divorce has been 
noted. On these points : 
Just what was said by Mrs. Baker as to the reasons 
for her secret, furtive departure from the state with 
the children~ That she apprehended that it was con-
trary to rights existing under the divorce decree is 
evident from her statement: (B. of E. 20): 
"If I had been given time, I would have got a 
court order to go there.'' 
An explanation of her meaning as to time is given in her 
direct testimony a.s follows: 
''No, only he made it so miserable for us. We 
decided that when my daughter here she got a 
place, we just pulled out and left him, after he 
had kicked up such a fuss against us, threatened 
my mother, threatened to knock her block off, one 
thing and another.'' (B. of E. 27). 
Later on cross examination, she was asked what she 
meant a.s to getting a court order, but answered instead, 
repeating this excuse: 
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''Well I don't really know what I had in mind. 
I just made up my mind I was going to get out 
of here as soon as I could. I couldn't stand his 
abuse-when he started on my mother I made up 
my mind." (B. of E. 30} 
These threats, appellant's only explanation of he-r 
bolting '""ith the children, 'Yere made as she pleads (Trs. 
043) after she had left the home with the children, so 
her evidence in pure hearsay. The mother was not 
called to testify. Respondent denied any threats, except 
(B. of E. 37) that he told Mrs. Baker's mother that 
''he ought to call the cops and send them after them'' 
when he found his children missing-hardly one warrant-
ing flight unless the fugitive intended to abscond from 
the state. 
That such removal had its motive in a desire to 
separate the children from any contacts with their father 
seems clear. True she denied that she had attempted 
to estrange the children from their father (B. of E. 24) 
but she testified (B. of E. 22) that on the visits respond-
ent always raised a disturbance, that whenever he came 
to visit, she or her mother remained in the room (B. of 
E. 31), that he had told her mother (B. of E. 30), when 
she interfered in an argument between the parents as 
to the children ''to keep out of it'', that her own temper 
was quick and (B. of E. 31) she" got riled up", so that 
his visits were ever the cause of a contention which the 
children heard, and didn't like, respondent on such oc-
casions losing his temper and using profane language. 
Mr. Baker testified (B. of E. 35) as to this that 
Mrs. Baker's mother ''stayed in there like a cop'' every 
time he visited, listened to what was said, and that he 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
resented it, but that he had not called names and (B. 
of E. 36) had been very careful of his conduct at all 
of his visits. He did not deny that the visits were the 
oceasion for continual contention between himself and 
Mrs. Baker and the latter's mother. 
As to the effect of all this on the children, Mrs. 
Baker testified : 
''They would just stand and look a.t him. They 
don't seem to know what to do. He never gave 
gave them any love before, they cannot very 
well go to him now. He misses them, he natur-
ally misses them, but they haven't any love there. 
I don't know how they could have." (B. of E. 27) 
''He made them nervous and irritable, because 
he started a row with me on account of taking 
them out.-He always wanted to take them out 
so as to be able to get a picture, he would have 
some silly thing like that." (B. of E. 22). 
It seems not to have occurred to this custodian 
that espionage upon her ex-husband's visits to his child-
ren would result in just what he saw. Children do not 
show their affection to the parent who had left the home 
while under the watchful eye of the parent who has 
control over their lives. Of course, they didn't ''know 
what to do'' and ''would just stand'' there. Appellant 
saw, in the attempts of respondent to get his children 
out door, where they might talk without restraint, and 
his wanting to ''get a picture'' just some ''silly thing''. 
Her true attitude towards his visits, her belief that 
they were useless as well as bothersome, her callous 
attitude towards the father's yearnings for his children 
are illustrated by this, a.s well as by her testimony that 
on her last visit to Ogden, as well as on her previous 
10 
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t'Yo, she had not brought the children (B. of E. 29) be-
cause "Then she asked if they wanted to come, they had 
said they did not; and also by her statement (B. of E. 25) 
that she 'Yould be "Tilling to have him call and visit 
them, ''in the presence of some one else.'' 
Not only does this attitude throw light upon the 
reasons for her taking the children from the state, it 
tends to negative her excuse that the welfare of her 
children is the reason for her taking, and keeping the 
children in Oregon. 
IS, 
Her only direct testimony, on this point (B. of E. 23) 
''Well they are close to the school's activity and 
they are happy. They weren't happy with him. 
They don't even know that he exists.'' 
She then gave an affirmative response to a ques-
tion if the children were happier in Nyssa that in Ogden. 
There is no evidence that the schools in Nyssa are 
more accessible, nor better equipped as to staff or facil-
ities than those left behind in Ogden. No considera-
tions of healthier climate are urged. No special facil-
ities for the education, the moral upbringing or any 
other phase of life which would make Nyssa better for 
the children appears. The only change in the atmos-
phere surrounding them of any note is the inability of 
respondent to see them often. True, when Mrs. Baker 
sold her property in Utah and bought the Nyssa home, 
it became very much to her interest to change her resi-
dence,-but the motive for her sale and purchase still 
is rooted in the desire to get the children away from 
the vicinty of the respondent. 
11 
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Where weighty considerations of the welfare of 
children exist, they take precedence over convenience 
of visiting by parents who have- not custody, but the 
right of visitation is a very important right, it sounds 
not only in the natural affections of parents, but in the 
fact that parenthood is not a matter for one sex only, 
and that children can learn much from both of their 
progenitors. Such a right yields only to ''the most 
compelling and exceptional circumstances'', (Williams 
v. Williams, 148 So. 358), giving reasons why the welfare 
of the children must he first considered. And its viola-
tions, as we shall see, is one which may give rise to loss 
of custody, a. well as punishment for contempt. 
We think the record supports the Court's findings 
as the matters essential to the disposition of this dis-
pute. 
The foregoing cover the general objection (Br. 27') 
to the findings as a whole. 
The remaining objections made under appellant's 
Point VII are easily disposed of. 
She complains tha.t Finding No. 5 is not material-
this relates at detail changes in his financial condition 
to entry of the decree. It was on matter of facts, put 
at issue by the pleadings. ( (Tr. 036-043). The Court 
was entitled to find on it. 
She charges that Finding No. 4 is not supported 
by the testimony. More examination of the evidence 
(B. of E. 2, 9, 12, 13 and 14) shows tha.t not true, and 
conditions surrounding employment of a railroad brake-
man are sufficiently a matter of general lrnowledge so 
that we submit that any re-asonable person would know 
the finding to speak the truth. 
12 
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The Conclusions of La\v are all attacked: We 
admit that the first conclusion, based on the first find-
ing and ruling in accordance therewith, that respondent 
".,.as not in contempt because appellant had ·not charged 
him \\Tith it in her pleading·, is not fortunately worded, 
but appellant admits in her proposed finding (Tr. 049) 
that, when that finding- \Yas submitted, these sums had 
been paid. And, as \Ye shall see, his default in payments 
is not a material factor in this case. The other conclu-
sions are supported by the finding·s, and are within 
the discretion of the trial judge. 
Appellant does not point out in what respect the 
decree is not supported by the evidence, save as she 
has raised the point in prior argument, and we do not 
seem called upon to analyze that matter further. We 
submit that this point is not well taken. 
POINT No. 2: THE COURT HAD POWER TO PUN-
ISH SUCH CONDUCT AS CON-
TEMPT, AND DEPRIVATION OF 
APPELLANT OF THE RIGHT TO 
ENFORCE HER JUDGMENT FOR 
PAST DUE INSTAL.LMEN'TS WAS 
A PROPER PENALTY, WITHIN THE 
DISCRETIONARY POWER OF THE 
COURT. 
Appellant unde-r her Point II argues that the de-
cree, p·roviding for visitation ''at reasonable times and 
places'' was not breached by her acts, because that 
decree did not affirmatively forbid taking the children 
from the state and was too indefinite and uncertain on 
that point for its breach to be punished as contemptuous. 
13 
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We concede that if the meaning of a decree is doubt-
ful under a fair construction, a. court may well hesi-
tate to impose a. penalty for a claimed breach, parti-
cularly where the consequences of adjudging contempt 
to have occured might be serious. Just such a. case was 
In Re Vaughan, (87 So. 792), which appellant cites, 
quoting at length (A. Br. 9) in her brief. The language 
quoted taken in its context, makes it obvious that the 
Court considered tha.t the mother might. well have 
thought, having remarried, her new husband a resi-
dent of another state, that the right of visitation might 
be ''within her proper control'' if given at. her new 
home, so that the decree, with that proviso, was not 
sufficiently definite to make her conduct a wilful breach 
of its terms-nor does the Court rest on that but 
expresses its doubt that, even if in contempt, she should 
be prohibited from defending an attempt to take the 
custody of the child from her. 
We do not say that there is not found language in 
decisions which seems to require an express prohibi-
tion against removal from the state before that removal 
is eontemptuous. The text books. reflect some uncer-
tainty in this field: 
''While the cases are not in complete accord, it 
appears generally to be the rule that if a wife is 
guilty of violating the provisions of an agreement 
between her husband and herself as to the custody 
of the children, the husband is relieved from mak-
ing further payments for the support of such 
children, whether such payments are provided for 
in the agreement between the parties, or have 
been adopted in a subsequent decree of divorce-. 
As in the case of the violation of the provisions 
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of aJl agreement, the authorities are not in agree-
ment as to the effect of a violation by the former 
\Yife of the provisions of a divorce decree in re-
spect of the custody of children on her right to 
recover payments provided by the decree for the 
support of the children.'' 17 Am. J ur. 536; Sect. 
705. 
Close examination of other cases cited by appellant 
upon this point detracts from their weight as authority. 
Much reliance is placed upon the Vaughan case (supra) 
and upon 
Barnes v. Lee (Ore.) 275 Pac. 661, (Appl. Br. 
10-11) 
Campbell v. Campbell, 37 Wis. 206, (Appl. Br. 
11-12) 
yet the first, on close analysis, is very weak authority, 
and the second seems to support respondent ,and not 
appellant. 
Lee, in the Oregon case, having won custody of a 
child in an Oklahoma divorce, with rights of custody 
reserved in the mother, came to Oregon with it. The 
mother, upon that ground, procured modification by the 
Oklahoma decree, giving her custody; and brought 
habeas corpus in Oregon. The court determines : (a) 
That the Oklahoma decree was "not entitled to full faith 
and credit so far as the question of custody is con-
cerned;" (b) that "on the real question in the ease, as 
to what would be best for the interests of the child" the 
trial court rightly determined that it should remain in 
the father's custody, and with "the real question" dis-
posed of (c) said : ''There wa.s no diso bediance of the 
order of the Oklahoma court in bringing the child with 
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him, so long as there was no provision in the order that 
she was not to be taken from the state.'' Citing Stetson 
v. Stetson, (Me.) 15 A. 60, 61. 
This last statement for which appellant cites it, is 
only dictum-since the case had previously been ruled 
on the first two grounds given-but the citation on 
which the Court relied shows that no real consideration 
had been given the question, and that the statement is 
uninformed dictum. For the Stetson case merely decides 
that, under a Maine statute, a trial court may place 
custody of the child of divorced parents in a non-resident 
custodian if its best interests demand, and the language 
relied on has reference to the Maine statute only. 
The Campbell ease says. that the decree, not ex-
pressly prohibiting the custodian mother from removing 
the child from the state, she was not "in strict contempt" 
in so doing. Just what is ''strict contempt'' does not 
appear there·, nor ean we find a. definition of it. It 
would seem the court must have meant some contempt 
for which no excuse might be received, for it goes on 
then to consider her c.onduct, says that the terms. of the 
decree "fairly implied" that the father had been 
adjudged the right to make visits on his child at Mil-
waukee, the common domicile, chides the mother for 
' 'vindictively' ' telling him that he could see the child in 
Chicago; then points out that the child was sickly, that 
by removing it to Chicago, where she could give it better 
care, she had been able to nurse it back to health and 
doubtless had saved the child's life, and adds: 
"We must say that. the necessities which pressed 
upon her and which she now pathetically pleads 
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for her conduct go Yery far to redeem he·r re-
moval of the child from the implication of wanton 
disregard of her duty to the Court and the ap-
pellant.'' 
Without laboring the point too much, this seems good 
authority for the Yiew·· that such a removal of the child 
from the jurisdiction, "'"here the decree fairly implied 
that visits should be had, would have been wanton dis-
regard of duty to the court-not a bad definition of con-
temptuous conduct-had it not been for the overbalanc-
ing excuse that it saved the child's health and perhaps 
its life. 
Examination of other cases cited by appellant under 
either Point II or IV, does not aid her contention. Those 
cases generally establish some point not here in dispute: 
For example: 
In Kane v. Kane, (1Iich.) 216 N.W. 438, the precise 
question raised in Stetson v. Stetson appeared. The 
father, under arrest in Windsor, Ontario, for non-sup-
port, jumped his bail, fled to Detroit, and four years 
later sued for divorce there. The mother crossed the 
river, defended, won custody and support money. The 
father appealed-his claim that a Michigan court lacked 
jurisdiction to order payment of support money to the 
non-resident custodian of a non-resident minor. The 
decision accurately states the law as to non-resident 
custody: 
"Where p·roofs are convincing the welfare of the 
child demands the course taken, its custody may 
and should be awarded the non-resident parent 
notwithstanding the effect may be to defeat 
visitation by the resident parent.'' 
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We submit the proofs in the instant ease were 
neither ·Convincing nor did they show a state of affairs 
which ''demanded'' defeat of the respondent's right of 
visitation. 
Other cases cited to this point were Bedolfe v. 
Bedolfe, (127 P. 594), a Washington case, and Waldref, 
v. Waldref, (159 N.W. 1068) a Minnesota ease. The Wal-
dref ease held that a father who had deserted his family, 
been divorced without rights of visitation reserved, 
could not insist on a modification giving him rights of 
visitation where the evidence indicated that such visits 
would he detrimental to the health of one of the children. 
The eourt in the Bedolfe ease, where the decree provided 
for visitation at ''reasonable times during reasonable 
hours of the- day'', said that the language was susceptible 
to interpretation as requiring that the child . should be 
kept in the jurisdiction of the c.ourt of divorce-; notes 
without passing on the matter that the lower court_ did 
not so interpret the decree, and determines that the 
welfare of the child would not be- subserved by returning 
it to its Washington residence, with the maternal grand-
mother, but warns the father's parents, where it was 
staying in Oregon, that they must treat the mother, 
when visiting the- ehild, with civility under pain of loss 
of custody, or of ·contempt proceedings against the 
father. 
Before presenting cases supporting our position, 
let us point out again the fundamental error appellant 
makes in her argument as to the penalty imposed upon 
her. The Court in this case did not in any wise modify 
the decree to eliminate past due installments of support 
moneys or alimony-the gist of appellant's Point III. 
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The Court's action is correctly stated in these terms: 
.A.s a penalty for her continuing· contempt, it withheld 
from her the right she had asked, to use the enforc.e-
ment po"\YL~rs of the C~ourt to obtain that money from 
respondent. In effect it said: While you are in con-
tempt, you may not come into this Court and seek to 
enforce rig·hts, other,Yise yours to enforc.e, under suc.h 
decree. Our cases generally are based on the rule stated 
next below. 
~~A parent who has been denied the right to visit 
a child, as provided in a decree of divorce, may 
apply to the Court of first instance for a modifi-
cation of the decree, or for a rule to show cause 
"\Yhy he or she should not be punished for con-
tempt. A divorced wife who refuses to permit 
a child to visit its father as provided by decree 
is not entitled to the aid of the court in collecting 
alimony until she has c·omplied with the decree, 
or offered to do so in good faith.'' 17 Am. J ur. 
516. 
In Eberhart v. Eberhart, (189· N.W. 592) the Min-
nesota decree provided only for reasonable rights of 
visitation. After the mother with custody had taken the 
children from the state, p-roceedings of the· same charac.-
ter had here arose. The eourt held, the Supreme Court 
affirming, that the mother might not have the aid of 
the court to enforce her claims for past due payments 
of support money and relieved the father from the pay-
ment of installments thereof subsequently accruing dur-
ing the absence of the children from the· state. 
In Combs v. Combs, (162 Pac. 273) upon a finding 
of removal of the child, by the mother with custody, 
from the county of residence, and that she had obstructed 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and prevented the father from having the- opportunity 
to visit the- child ''at reasonable times and places'' the 
Kansas Court affirmed a modification of the decree 
which placed custody in the father, and to a suggestion 
as to absence of evidence to show the mother to be an 
unfit person to have -custody continued in her, said: 
''There was evidence to support another ground 
of the motion-that the plaintiff had 'obstructed 
and prevented the defendant from seeing said 
child or having an opportunity to visit with him 
at re-asonable times and places'. Disobedience of 
the original decree naturally worked a modifi-
cation thereof. ' ' 
A result substantially similar to that which appel-
lant thinks happened here is found in Weinbaum v. 
Weinbaum (153 Atl. 303.) where the Rhode Island de-
cree granted the father the right, so long as he was 
resident in that state, to visit the child "at reasonable 
times and places.'' The mother took the child to Florida, 
the father withheld some of the payments of support 
moneys due from him, and the mother returning to the 
jurisdiction cited him in for non-payment. It was held 
that, having placed it out of her power to perform tha.t 
part of the decree affecting her, she was entitled to no 
moneys during the period she kept the child out of the 
state. 
Distance, as well as questions of jurisdiction come 
into such cases, and it is obvious that here, had Mrs. 
Baker taken the children to some Nevada town at the 
other end of Mr. Baker's run, his complaint as to the 
hindrance upon his rights she imposed -by changing her 
residence would have little weight. It the case of In 
Re Hipple (256 Pa.c. 1015), the Kansas court found a 
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move from Hutchinson to Wichita-about as far as 
from Og-den to Provo,-improper. It evidently con-
siders the rause of the removal to be the greater facil-
ity afforded the mother in resisting visitation by her 
husband. 
Where the divorce decree rontained no provision 
for visitation by the father, in Th!eyers v. Meyers, (126 
N. W. 8-!1) it appeared that the parties had stipulated 
as to custody, reserving· a rig·ht of visitation in the 
father, that provision having been omitted by her coun-
sel in preparing the decree. The father discontinued 
payment of support moneys when the wi~e took the 
children from the state. Upon like proceedings to those 
here, he pleaded deprivation of visitation, the omis-
sion of the provision from the decree, and asked modi-
fication to show his right, and relief against payment 
during deprivation of that right. The Court refused 
to enforce payment of past due installments, modified 
the decree to strike out all provisions for subsequent 
payments, and provided that upon the mother return .. 
ing the children to the state, she might ask for modifi-
cation restoring the support moneys. 
In Williams v. Williams, (148 So. 358) where the 
husband had been required by the Mississippi divorce 
decree to pay off a mortgage on the wife's home, and 
attorney's fees, had paid $120.00 on the mortgage and 
$50.00 on the fees, he requested with his last remit-
tance the child be permitted to visit with him at his· 
home-the decree giving that right to him '' a.t reason-
able times and intervals''. The request not being comp-
plied with, he renewed it. Upon further non-comp-
liance, believing that if the other amounts due from 
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him were paid, any subsequent request for a visit from 
the child would be ignored, he deposited installments 
falling due from him in a bank, until substantially all 
due was so deposited, the hank then failing and the 
moneys being lost. Upon a petition that he be required 
to pay the sums accrued, or be adjudged in contempt, 
it was held, 
''One party may not successfully call upon the 
other to perform the· duties and obligations im-
posed upon the latter, unless the petitioning 
party shows that, on his or her part, he or she 
has done those things which the contract or de-
eree requires of him or her, or else presents 
and substantiates. such a complete and well 
founded excuse that the petitioner's default may 
for the time he postponed or substituted; and the 
case, when an excuse will he received and the 
other party nevertheless required to perform, will 
be rare and under the most compelling and ex-
ceptional c.ircumstances.-W e are of the opinion 
that she is not entitled to invoke the aid of the 
Court, and the decree will be reversed and her 
petition dismissed, without prejudice to a re-
newal when the required conditions have been 
complied with, or there has. been a. real offer in 
good faith to do so." 
In Harris v. Harris, (189 N.Y.S. 215) when the 
wife, who under a decree of separation had custody of 
the child, went with the child to Nevada to obtain a di-
vorce, the Court held that she was not entitled to invoke 
the power of the court in c.ontempt proceedings to en-
foree payments of moneys which had accrued under the 
separation decree, so long as she remained without the 
state in defiance of the terms of that decree. 
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In another New York case, Sch,veig v. Sc.hweig, (107 
N.Y.S. 905), the mother 'vho lived in Pittsburg at the 
commencement of the action had obtained an order for 
support moneys pendente lite, the order requiring her 
to haYe the child in N e"~ York City twice a week for a 
Yisit "'"ith its father. She did not comply, neither did 
he. The Appellate Court reversed an order permitting 
him to withhold payment so long as s4e failed to afford 
the rights of visitation, but on the purely procedural 
ground that she had not been adjudged by the lower 
court to be in contempt for defeating, impairing or pre-
judicing a right or remedy of a party in the litigation-
and certainly the court would have been well justified 
in so adjudging under her admitted conduct. 
The Florida Supreme Court held in Van Loon v. 
Van Loon (182 So. 205) a case cited by appellant under 
her point III, that strong equitable reasons, rising out 
of radically changed circumstances, might authorize 
a court to refuse to enforce its decree by contempt or 
ne exeat proceedings, even though all power to change or 
modify it had been lost by reason of the installments 
having accrued and the right thereto become vested. 
In square opposition to Lee v. Barnes, (supra) we 
call attention to St. E'cx: rei Nipp, v. District Court, 128 
P. 590, a Montana case, where, after a divorce in Omaha, 
with ea.ch parent given a child, subject to the right of 
the other to visit, the parents being enjoined against 
"interposing any obstacle or hindrance in the way of 
the other'', the father took both of the minor children 
to Montana and established a residence. It would seem 
the child given to the mother's custody was returned 
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without us,e of process. The mother, on such facts, ob-
tained from the Nebraska Court a modification award-
ing her custody of both children; came with it to Mon-
tana, filed habeas corpus, and was met with the object-
ion that she was not a fit person to have custody, being 
addicted to the use of drugs. The Montana. trial court 
struck out this pleading, and awarded the child to the 
mother. 
In an original proceeding to vacate the order, the 
appellant court disregarded the father's, contention that 
''since the award in the original decree did not in terms 
prohibit him from removing the son to Montana, he was 
at liberty to establish his own domicile in Montana, and 
thus that of the son, and having done so, it was incum-
bent upon the district court to determine the question 
of custody without reference to the amendment made 
to the decree by the Nebraska court''. It held that the 
Omaha deeree was entitled to the protection of the ''full 
faith and credit clause", and that the provisions of the 
original decree were ''tantamount to a direction to him 
to keep the son within the jurisdiction of the court whose 
ward he was"; citing the Campbell case a.s authority. 
:mven where no divorce was involved, in Allison v. 
Bryan, (109 P. 935) a Kansas case, the father of an 
illegitimate child, who had taken it into his home and 
legitimatized it, was adjudged in contempt for failure 
to obey the order of the Court granting the mother 
rights of visitation, even though she had taken possession 
of the child and gone with it to Oklahoma, losing custody 
there upon a habeas corpus brought by the father. In 
Cole v. Sp. Ct. (151 P. 169) a mother who refused to com-
ply with the father's request, for a visit from his child 
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as provided in a decree giYing the mother c.ustody wa.s 
held to be in contempt of the California Court and in 
Cole Y. Addison (58 P. ~d, 1013) an Oregon decision, 
"'"here the "ife obtained custody in a divorce action 
"\Yhich gaYe the husband the right to visit the c.hild at 
all reasonable times, and "\Yhere provisions for support 
were contractual, the Court held that the mother 
breached the contract by taking the ehild to live with 
her in New York and not sending it back for visits with 
the father as agreed upon, and lost any right of re-
covery under the contract for support moneys .. 
Last under her Point No. II, appellant comp~lains 
that her fine is gTeater than that permitted under Title 
45 of the Civil Code. That is shortly answered for, in 
the first place, we do not have here any fine, that being 
a penalty payable to the State, and not a mere depriva-
tion of the right of process, and to the claim that such 
a penalty is all that may be imposed on a party in con-
tempt to enforce compliance, we may point to the wide 
use of such means of coercion in case after case we 
have cited, going even to deprivation of custody. The 
defendant in MacPherson v. MacPherson, (89 P. 2d 
382) had been fined the limit, ordered jailed for the 
maximum amount permitted by the California statutes 
on civil contempt, and ordered to pay very large sums 
for the use of his former wife in her future attempts 
to recover from his custody of the children to which she 
was entitled, and with whom he had fled from the state 
to Mexico. When, on his appeal from the order requir-
ing him to supply the means of litigation to his ad-
versary, he was met with a motion to strike his appeal, 
because he then was in continuing contempt, he likewise 
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pleaded that, having been penalized all the statute on 
contempt permitted, no additional penalty could be im-
posed on him. The Court said : 
''There is no language in Section 1218 which in 
any way places a limitation upon the power of 
the Courts to refuse a hearing to contumacious 
litigants. (Quoting the statute fixing fine and 
time of imprisonment.) This statute will not 
be construed to infringe upon the· court's inherent 
power to ignore the demands of litigants who 
persist in defying the legal orders and processes 
of the s,tate. '' 
The matter is not worth further labor. 
Holding in mind the rule heretofore quoted from 
17 Am. Jur. 516, and supported by the cases we have 
cited, as well as inferentially by some of appellant's 
cas,es, that the court has power to coerce, as for con .. 
tempt, the parent with custody who denies to the other 
parent reasonable rights of visitation, which coercion 
may be by withholding enforcements of rights otherwise 
enforcible by the custodian and arising under the same 
decree, or by punishment for contempt, we must turn to 
another point, since the questions are much intermingled: 
Point No.3. REDU·CTION OF FUTURE INSTALL-
MENTS OF SUPPORT MONEYS WAS 
WITHIN THE DISCRETIONARY 
POWER OF THE COURT UNDER THE 
CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES OCCAS-
IONED BY REMOVAL OF THE CHILD-
REN FROM UTAH. 
I 
Much of what we ha.ve said and many of the citations 
made under our last point are applicable here. For if 
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the Court may 'Yithhold payment of support moneys 
while the custodian, entitled to them, is in contempt of 
another part of the order, the right to modify the 
amounts payable, to conform to the circumstances arising 
from taking- the child from the stn te, is equally clear, and 
is in fact a milder aspect of the use of the power of 
coercion. There simply is nothing c.ontrary to this in 
the citations made from the Utah cases and other 
authorities referred to on pages. 5 and 6 of appellant's 
brief. 
The rule of course is that modification may be had 
only under a. change in circumstances. What more 
change of circumstances is required than the showing 
made here. As the Michigan court said in Myers v. 
Myers, (106 N.W. 403), where exactly this same question 
was raised: 
''If any change of circumstances, or new facts 
arising since the decree were necessary to be 
shown, they may be found in the prolonged ab-
sence of the daughter from the state of Michigan, 
and the inability to visit guaranteed to defend-
ant by the contract, with no assurance that the 
daughter will ever return to the state.'' 
Certainly there is no assurance here that the Baker 
children will ever return to Utah-most certainly they 
will not if the appellant can prevent it. The later cas·e 
of Meyers v. Meyers (supra) approves the language 
quoted. Both were cases ·where a stipulation providing 
for rights of visitation by the father had not been fol-
lowed in the decree, and the Court first modified the 
decree to include it, and then cut off support moneys 
due under it for breach of the agreement. Waive as to 
this the fact that the Court found impairment of re-
spondent's financial standing to have occurred. If the 
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worst comes to .the worst, he can let his ruined property 
stand idle, can fail in his tractor payments and lose it-
can even lose his insurance through non-payment of the 
loan thereon. But these changed circumstanc.es ap-
peared. Before the Thanksgiving period in 1948, he 
had only to walk, or ride a bus, or take a. few minutes 
ride in a. taxicab to see his children. Now he must 
travel some 800 miles, must lose, as the Court found 
from strong supporting evidence, approximately $100.00 
in time and expense each time he pays a visit to his 
children. That is a well defined change in circumstances, 
and one created by the act of the appellant. 
Not only do cases already referred to herein give 
instances of modification, with removal the factor prin-
cipally or solely creating change in circumstances; but 
appellant under her point IV gives citation to other 
instances:: 
In Feinberg v. Feinberg, 66 Atl. 611) the New 
Jersey chancellor as quoted by appellant at page 19 of 
her brief, refused to relieve against support moneys al-
ready accrued, upon the ground that the father should 
have asked modification when new conditions arose. 
(Which Baker did.) But appellant should have called 
this Court's attention to what followed: 
In this case it appears that the mother with custody, 
subject to rights of visitation, took the child to Pitts-
burgh, some 250 to 300 miles from most New Jersey 
points. Some· suggestion had been made that she would 
be willing to set up a' residential domicile for the child in 
Philadelphia, and readily accessible from all points in 
that state. The chancellor gave time to the parties to 
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file additional affidavits respecting the effect of such a 
residence, and reserved for decision, until any such new 
affidavits 'Yere available, the question: 
'' \Vnether an order should be made diseontinuing 
the payments until the minor is returned to the 
jurisdiction, or ".,.hether the order should permit 
the minor to be maintained in Philadelphia, with 
the right of visitation specified in the decree 
fully protected.'' 
In Zirkle v. Zirkle, (172 N.E. 19·2), an Indiana case 
cited by appellant under Point IV of her brief, the 
minor at the time of the divorce was not within the juris-
diction of the Indiana court of divorce jurisdiction, and 
thereafter was taken from the state. The court denied 
the right of the father to withhold payments of support 
moneys after that removal,-it is not clear to what ex-
tent this was based upon the fact that the child was 
never in the jurisdiction of the divorce court-. hut, as 
quoted by appellant, pointed out that the father had the 
remedy of asking for modification of the decree so that 
it would require return of the child to the court's juris-
diction or the state. 
In Altschuler v. Altschuler (284 N.Y.S. 93) the 
court pointed out that the father, whose ex-wife had 
removed with their child to California and so violated 
the provisions of the decree, had the remedy of securing 
a modification of the decree as to payment of moneys 
to her thereunder. 
Point No.4. MONETARY LOSS TO APPEL,LANT IS 
NOT OBJECTIONABLE AS WITH-
HOLDING MONEYS FROM CHILDREN. 
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While we do not quarrel with a rule broadly stated, 
that a divorce does not sever the parent's responsibilities 
towards his or her children, to argue, as does appellant, 
that reduction in support moneys payable to the mother 
with custody is equivalent to stealing the bread from 
the children's mouths somewhat overstates the case. 
The order fixing the amount which the divorced parent 
must contribute to the support of the children does not 
make the moneys paid the moneys of the children, nor 
is there an obligation on the part of the parent custodian 
to account for expenditure thereof, nor to ·show that all 
re-ceived was expended on the children alone. The con-
verse is also true, the parent with custody may not 
hold the other parent for moneys spent for the upkeep 
of the children in excess of the amount ordered paid by 
the Court: 
Adair v. Court (Ariz.) 33 P. 2d 995. 
Under our laws, as well as those of California, the 
parents are jointly and severally liable for the expenses 
of the family and the education of the children. (Utah 
Code Ann. 1943, 40-2-9), and a wife who receives a 
property settlement, in lieu of alimony, is not thereby 
absolved from bearing such part of the burde~ of tlie 
upbringing of the children as the Court does not place 
on the father. To shift a part of that burden from the 
father to the mother, for such time as the mother per-
sists in conduct calculated to estrange the children from 
their father, is a means of coercion of the spouse guilty 
of such conduct well within the powers and the discretion 
of the trial court.· 
''The mother is charged equally with the child's 
father to protect nurture and educate their infant 
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prog·eny. (Citing Civil Code). The award of 
Nancy's custody to appellant and the require-
ment that respondent pay money for her sup-
port did not absolYe appellant from a parent's 
obligation.-After spurning the court's decree by 
removing Nancy from the state she was in no 
better position to demand a continuance of re-
spondent's contribution to the child's support 
than she would have been had the father been 
removed from this mundane sphere.-She- now 
argues for her own advantage while pretending 
an interest solely for the child. But protes-
tations in behalf of the daughter are unavailing 
for the reason that, in the absence of a. showing 
that the child is in need, she will not be con-
sidered a party to the proceeding.'' 
White v. White (Cal.} 163 P. 2d 89 
• 
To the same effect are substantially all of the ci-
tations and cases we have previously discussed herein, 
where the question involved conduct of the wife, involv-
ing impairment of rights of visitation, and a change of 
custody was not asked including 17 Am. Jur. 516 (R. 
Br. 19), Eberhart v. Eberhart (R. Br. 19), Weinbaum v. 
Weinbaum (R. Br. 20), Meyers v. Meyers (R. Br. 21), 
Harris v. Harris, (R. Br. 22), Schweig v. Sehweig (R. 
Br. 23), Cole v. Addison (R. Br. 25), Myers v. Myers 
(R. Br. 27), Feinberg v. Feinberg (R. Br. 28), and 
Altschuler v. Altschuler (R. Br. 29), in each of which 
coercion of the custodian, to performanc.e of her 
duty to the court and the other parent, by withholding 
of support moneys was either permitted, or so dis-
cussed as to show it to be considered a remedy open 
to the Court and the parent, whose rights to see his 
children had been defeated by the custodian's conduct. 
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It seems significant that none of the cases cited 
by appellant squarely holds that a reduction or comp-
lete termination of payment of support money is not 
proper, where the children are taken far from the 
domicile of the divorce, where they are estranged from 
the father, and his chances of seeing them, holding or 
winning back their affection, have been thwarted by 
such removal. We have discussed everything cited by 
appellant, except Hatch v. Hatch (192 A. 241), Thomas 
v. Thomas (233 Ill. App. 488) and Heimbold v. Heim-
bold (217 N.Y.S. 379), the latter two cases referred to 
in the eitation she gives on page 22 of her brief from 
88 A.L.R. 200; and the citation on page 21 from 20 
A.L.R. 838. 
The Hatch case goes to the rule that vested pay-
ments of alimony may not be reduced by retrospective 
modification of the decree ; the Heimhold case holds 
simply that, with the divorced wife a resident, the 
remedy of the father deprived of rights of visitation is 
an appeal to the court to enforce his right, and not with-
holding of payments due from him; In the· Thomas case 
the Court says that the father is not relieved of all 
liability for the support of his children by his wife's 
interference with his rights of visitation-and the A.L. 
R. text gives a somewhat extreme statement as to the 
considerations surrounding the appointment of custod-
ians of minors. None of these citations hit the bullseye 
at which appellant aims. 
This resolves itself down to the question of whether 
the children are harmed by the action of the Court. 
Significantly again, there is no testimony from Mrs. 
Baker which even hints upon their lacking any of the 
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necessaries of life. She spe-aks, as we have noted under 
Point No. 1, of their being- happy, better off at Nyssa 
than they had been in Ogden, and this in spite of the 
fact that only $50.00 had been paid on support moneys 
bet,veen November lOth, 1948, and the time of trial 
eig·ht months later. She O\Yned a residence in West 
Ogden, (B. of E. 19) and had received in the divorce 
(Tr. 019) Ogden property, which had some indebted-
ness on it, both of \vhich she had sold. She had $50.00 
a month coming in from sale of oneof her properties (B. 
of E:. 26), and it would seem paid $25.00 a month on the· 
balance on the Nyssa property (B. of E. 29) and $26.67 
on debts on the Utah property, but from her other pro-
perty, sold for $7,500.00, (B. of E:. 30), she received 
$100.00 a month. She had with her an unmarried 
daughter who paid her $35.00 a month for room and 
board. In other words with the $60.00 monthly pay-
able by respondent, $150.00 monthly from her Utah 
properties, less $53.00 payable upon the Nyssa home 
and one of the properties sold, and $35.00 from the 
unmarried daughter, Mrs. Baker has had since entry 
of the order herein about $190.00 a month to use, and 
of course has had no rents to pay. She says she had 
reserves (B. of E. 26) for her use during the period 
when no support moneys came in. Obviously she had 
good reason for not contending that the children had 
been suffering for want of the support money, and for 
not protesting that the children would suffer if the de-
cree was modified by reducing support moneys, as res-
pondent had asked. 
And equally obviously, the Court rightly held that 
she, and not the children, had suffered from the with-
holding of support. 
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We submit that, on this record, the Court had open 
to it, in its judicial discretion, the power to withhold 
means of collecting through the Court's process moneys 
due her, and of reducing the moneys payable to her 
during the period of her continuing contempt. 
Point No.5. THE COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO 
DENY RES P 0 ND E NT REiLIEF BE-
CAUSE OF DEFAULT IN PAYMENTS 
DUE FROM HIM. 
This is the converse of Appellant's Point III. The 
only authority cited by appellant under that point which 
sustains her proposition is the last sentence from 27 
C. J. S. 1239, there quoted (Br. 17) to the effect that 
''defendant's application to set aside order for main-
tenance of children, or reduction of award will not be 
considered until he pays all arrears due under the orig-
inal dec.ree. '' As sole authority that text cites in a 
footnote Cooper v. Cooper, (N. J.) 143 A. 559. 
The Cooper case concerned a chronic evader of res-
ponsibilites to his -children, imposed by a divorce decree, 
whose reasons for asking reduction of amounts pay-
able the Court seemed to care little for. The· decision 
is contrary to the Feinberg ruling-- and is not good law 
in New Jersey or elsewhere. 
The correct rule on such matters is as follows: 
"Where a husband seeks a reduction of alimony, 
the fact that he resists the payment of what has 
accrued does not compel the court to refuse a 
reduction but is a circumstance· justifying the 
refusal of a reduction.'' 1g, C. J. 277. 
''If the existence of accrued and unpaid alimony 
should be held to absolutely prevent the court 
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from altering, reducing, or altogether abrogat-
ing· future installments of alimony, then it would 
result that, in cases of pecuniary inability of the· 
defendant to pay and discharge all arrea.rages 
of alimony, the court would be powerless to 
grant relief as to future and further alimony, 
no matter 'Yhat the ehanged conditions of the 
parties in the property, or how loudly the facts 
and circumstances might call for the equitable 
intervention of the Court. The hands of a court 
of equity are not thus bound". Craig v. Craig, 
(Ill.), 45 N. E. 153-cit. p. 154. 
The Craig case next above .is one cited by app·el-
lant under Point III of her brief. She there cites also 
Wassung v. Wassung (Nebr.) 286 N. W. 349 
Kell v. Kell (Ia.) 161 N. W. 636 
Delbridge v. Sears (Ia.) 160 N. W. 218 
Van Loon v. Van Loon (Fla.) 182 So. ?.0~ 
in each of which the court either granted modification 
as to future payments of alimony at a time when the 
petitioner was in default on payments already accrued, 
or, in one instance, referred the matter to a referee to 
determine what modification was justified. 
The Utah case of Myers v. Myers (62 Utah 90, 218 
P. 123), and the other cases cited by appellant under 
this point are authority for the rule stated in the first 
part of the quote from 27 C. J. S. 1239, on page 17 of 
her brief, to-wit: that an installment of moneys once 
due may not be cancelled out by a subsequent modifica-
tion of the decree. They have no reference to questions 
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of withholding relief from those in contempt. If appel-
lant were right, this Court should strike her appeal, 
since she makes no showing of any attempt to purge 
herself of her wrongful conduct. 
Point No.6: THE COURT DE,NIED APPELLANT'S 
REQUEST FOR 'MODIFICATION OF 
THE DECRE'E TO PERMIT CONTIN-
UED RESIDENCE IN OREGON, AND 
WAS NOT REQUIRED TO AFFORD 
HE.R AN OPPORTUNITY TO PURGE 
HERSELF OF CONTEMPT. ! 
The facts surrounding the- two matters above re-
ferred to, which appellant urges as her Points V and 
VI, are so essentially the same that one argument is 
enough for hoth. 
When this ca.se closed, the status of appellant as 
to her intention to remain in Oregon had not changed. 
She had pleaded, as we have seen, that it was absolutely 
necessary for her to live there, and the nearest she had 
come showing willingness to right the wrong she had 
done respondent was· her offer to bring or send down 
the children, onee or twice a year (B. of E. 25) if oppor• 
tunity served. She continued to persist in her wrongful 
conduct. 
There may he instances where a court of equity 
should afford one in contempt the oportunity to right 
the wrong and escape punishment, but not so when the 
contemner pleads and by testimony shows her intention 
to p·ersist. Where a continuing penalty attends persis-
tence in the contempt, the contemner may accept the 
penalty, and continue the conduct, or escape the penalty 
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by conforming to the decree, and asking restoration of 
rig·hts. The opportunity to purg-e her contempt, which 
appellant says has been denied her, has always heen 
and is still open to her. Upon her return to U tab, the 
principal reason for reduction of her monthly payments, 
the added expense of visitation imposed on the respond-
ent,-\\"ill terminate. If she then shows willingness to 
afford reasonable rights of visitation to respondent, the 
Court would feel that a large part, if not all, of grounds 
for reduction in support moneys was gone-and could 
not, as we see it, refuse her appropriate relief as. to en-
forcement of her judgment for past due sums. Of 
course, if respondent had not the means to pay in full, 
it could afford him time in which to make up the hack 
payments. . 
The Court, as the cases show, might well have di-
rected her to bring the children back to Utah and, im-
posed, as penalty for nQn-compliance, loss of custody 
or complete loss of assistance towards support of the 
children. (Such an order as to change of custody pro-
bably, in view of the Oregon decision on that point, would 
have not been enforcible.) Appellant complains of the 
leniency rather than of the severity of the Court. The 
fa~t is, of course, that the Court simply accepted the 
situation as Mrs. Baker had made it, and tried to equit-
ably adjust the matter so that the respondent would 
still he able to visit his children but with a part of his 
expense carried by appellant. From a practical point 
of view, that leavBs appellant open to retain her Nyssa 
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To have modified the dec.ree as she asked would 
have been to approve her conduct. The court might 
have done so, had .circumstances justified it. But such 
justification must have been clearly established, based 
on factors affecting the best interests of the children, 
and not merely beneficial to the mother. The Court 
did not accept her contention that removal to Nyssa was 
required by the children's best interests. The whole 
reeord shows that it was only the mother's interests 
and desires which occasioned it. 
The legal presumption prevailing when other cir-
cumstances are relatively weak against it, is that the 
welfare of the children is promoted by their residence 
in the jurisdiction of the court whose wards, by force 
of the divorce proceeding, they have become. So sit-
uated, they are where the Court may give better super-
vision of .their affairs, and better· determine matters 
as to their welfare if questions arise. 
McGonigle v. McGonigle, (Colo.) 151 P. 197 
In Re Hipple, (Supra.) 
Busser v. Busser, /(Okla.) 296 P. 401 
Stirett v. Stirett, (Wyo.) 248 P. 1015 
Williams v. Williams, (Colo.) 147 P. 2d 477 
20 A. L. R. 840-under note cited by appellant, 
(Br. 21) 
The MeGonigle case says : '' It is against the policy 
of the law to permit its ( a child of divorced parents) 
removal unless its well being and future welfare de-
mand it." The A. L. R. note cites cases to the same 
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effect. The last t'Yo cases are among- a number of deci-
sions "·hich sn8tain requirements that custodians, desir-
ing to remoYe children from the judisdiction, may be 
required to giYe substantial bound to insure their re-
turn. 
We submit that there are no factors here which 
required the court to regularize appellant's wrongdoing. 
Point No. 7. THE COURT PROPERLY REJECTED 
TESTI~IONY ON MATTERS PRE-
VIOUSLY LITIGATED AND DETER-
MINED. 
At the trial, appellant, without requesting modi-
fication of the decree as to rights of visitation, and 
without pleading the matter so that respondent would 
be apprized and prepared to meet it, tendered evidence 
as to matters, occurring prior to the trial of the origi-
nal divorce case, and apparently offered to show that 
respondent was an unfit person to visit or have aught 
to do with his children. The files in the divorce action 
are part of the record before this court (B. of E. 33) 
and show (Tr. 014) pleading by appellant that ~r. 
Baker was an unfit person to have any care, custody 
or control over his children by reason of ''his idea on 
sex and his ideas with respect to society and economics.'' 
The finding on the divorce trial, {Tr. 018) are en-
tirely wanting in any finding of his unfitness to have 
the entire custody of the children placed in him, hut 
award that custody to the mother solely because ''ever 
since the respective births of the children, plaintiff 
has had their care, custody and control.'' The case had 
been contested, ( Tr. 021). 
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The Court, upon this record, excluded the testi-
mony as being matter which had been settled and de-
termined by the trial, and not open to further litiga-
tion. Its ruling was in accordance with the law appel-
lant urges under her Point I,-that decrees are not sub-
ject to modification except by a showing of matters 
arising thereafter which invoke the equitable powers 
. of the court. Had she filed a petition for modification 
respecting visitation by the father, and showed some 
ground for suppression of such evidence at the former 
trial which sounded in fraud or overreaching, then and 
then only, it might have been admissible. 
The Court will not require argument that such 
evidence, so offered, without notice, under circum-
stances likely to induce perjury, and on matters' where 
·bare denial only would have been available to the other 
party, would have been of little weight to a fair minded 
judge, had it been received. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the lower court should b~ con-
firmed. 
That the Court should shift to- appellant a greater 
part of the expense of maintenance of the children, and 
should withhold from her the right to use the processes 
of the Court while herself refusing rights given respond-
ent thereunder is amply within the reasonable dis-
cretion of the Court, in cases of this character. Should 
the lower court refuse to restore the rights withheld 
upon due, showing of compliance, and of want of other 
change in material factors, then this Court might well 
listen to the plea now made. 
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The theory that respondent had no standing in 
c.ourt has been shown to be absolutely without founda-
tion; appellant's plea for an order regularizing her 
Oregon residence equally """anting in equitable consi-
derations. We think the record free from reversible · 
error, and wanting in any considerations which would 
lead an appellate court, having in mind the discre-
tion pertaining to courts of the first instance in such 
matters, to make any modification in the orders and 
decree under consideration. 
Respectfully submitted 
Stuart P. Dobbs 
of 
Dobbs & Dobbs 
Attorneys for Respondent 
812 David Eccles Building 
Ogden, Utah 
Respondent's Address: 
Richard Mills Baker 
2731 Madison Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 
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